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COMMENT ON NOLL AND KRIER, 
"SOME IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY FOR RISK REGULATION" 
COLIN F. CAMERER* 
WE have known about systematic violations of the expected utility 
(EU) theory of choice for almost forty years, since Maurice Allais got 
Jimmie Savage to violate his own "sure-thing principle" (or "indepen- 
dence axiom") while making hypothetical choices over lunch in Paris. 
Savage was victimized by some combination of wine and intuition. The 
wine's effect is gone, but the intuition is not: devotion to EU sometimes 
produces unappealing choices.1 
For half of the forty years since Allais's choice demonstration, psychol- 
ogists have been actively studying judgment, too. The reigning paradigm 
focuses on simplifying "heuristics" people use to lighten their cogni- 
tive load but which produce systematic violations of normative the- 
ory ("biases").2 Violations occur even when subjects are experts about 
normative rules (for example, statisticians) or in substantive areas 
(for example, doctors). When subjects are paid for accuracy, viola- 
tions are sometimes reduced slightly, but rarely eliminated. Given the 
robust evidence, it is high time to study how these violations affect the 
institutional world of households, firms, markets, and bureaucracies out- 
side the psychology lab. Noll and Krier take a useful step in this direc- 
tion.3 
* Professor, Decision Sciences Department, Wharton School of the University of Penn- 
sylvania. 
See Martin Weber & Colin F. Camerer, Recent Developments in Modelling Preferences 
under Risk, 9 OR Spektrum 129 (1987), for a review. 
2 See Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds. 1982). 
3 Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk 
Regulation, in this issue. 
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I. PUTTING PROSPECT THEORY TO WORK PRODUCTIVELY 
Noll and Krier spend much of their article trying to derive implications 
from the value and decision-weighting functions of prospect theory. But 
many policy situations are too broad or too narrow for prospect theory. 
Most choices involve distributions over several attributes (so-called mul- 
tiattribute utility), typically lives and dollars. Prospect theory is too nar- 
row for these choices. Also, much policy debate revolves around judg- 
ments of likelihoods ("How lethal is Alar?") or riskiness ("Can we 
tolerate the possibility of nuclear catastrophe?") rather than around 
choices; prospect theory is then too broad. 
Even when it is appropriate, deriving specific predictions from prospect 
theory is a struggle because choices depend both on the shape of utility 
(or "value") and on how probabilities are weighted; often these two 
interact and make predictions indeterminate. In my view, prospect theory 
is a skeleton of empirical facts over which a theory is draped. It might be 
easier to get policy-level predictions directly from the empirical facts. For 
example, framing effects are an empirical fact. They occur because 
choices depend on the reference point from which gains and losses are 
evaluated. As Noll and Krier point out, public debates about risk will then 
depend on whether possible outcomes are evaluated as gains (relative, 
say, to an inferior technology) or losses (relative to a reference point of 
zero risk). As reference points shift, public attitudes toward risk shift, 
too. The fickleness of public attitudes is thus an important indirect impli- 
cation of prospect theory; it depends on the empirical existence of fram- 
ing effects, not on which frame people choose (which is good, because 
frame choices are hard to predict).4 
Another empirical fact with many implications is loss aversion. Loss 
aversion is powerful by itself: it can explain why people dislike risks in 
which they could gain or lose, without invoking curvature of utility func- 
tions. Loss aversion can also explain "endowment effects": the large, 
systematic deviation between buying and selling prices. (Selling prices are 
higher because giving something up causes a loss, which is more aversive 
than the gain from buying; so people must be paid more to sell.) In studies 
on siting a hazardous waste repository in Nevada, most people said they 
would not allow a site within one hundred miles unless they were paid 
$5,000 a year for twenty years (their selling price). The same people said 
they would only pay one hundred dollars a piece to move the facility away 
once it was located nearby. These large buying/selling price discrepancies 
4 See Baruch Fischhoff, Predicting Frames, 9 J. Exp. Psych.: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 103 (1983). (It is hard to infer a frame for choices that is consistent with subjects' 
judgments of which frames were most "natural.") 
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are experimentally robust-they tend to shrink in magnitude, but not 
disappear, when subjects are highly motivated and experienced.5 They 
are also disturbing: which price is a better measure of value? 
The tenacity of endowment effects may also help explain why entitle- 
ments like Social Security are virtually impossible to cut from the federal 
budget and why imposing new risks (for example, nuclear power) is 
difficult while comparable familiar risks (smog or earthquakes in Los 
Angeles) are accepted, even, until recently, joked about. 
II. OTHER DIRECTIONS 
Let me sketch four other categories of thinking in behavioral decision 
theory that might help us understand and regulate risk. 
1. Intertemporal Choice. Most risks unfold over time. The standard 
generalization of EU in such settings is "discounted utility." For a com- 
parison to present outcomes, future outcomes are weighted by a discount 
factor that reflects the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption then and 
now. Presumably the discount factor is less than one because of "impa- 
tience," probability of death, and so on. 
In several recent studies, many anomalies in intertemporal choice have 
emerged that are surprisingly like the anomalies in EU.6 For example, 
people are more impatient (discount rates are higher) for short delays than 
for long delays.' If two Thai dinners next year are as good as one Thai 
dinner now, then two dinners in thirty years and one dinner in twenty- 
nine years should be equivalent. For most people they are not (they prefer 
the two dinners in thirty years). The size of short-term discount rates 
might explain why citizens are so impatient to reduce risk and solve 
problems by spending a lot now (for, say, National Guard patrols of 
crack-infested District of Columbia neighborhoods) rather than spreading 
spending over future years, when it might be used more efficiently. 
Another anomaly in intertemporal choice is that speeding up risks is 
more painful than delaying them is pleasant-much as selling is more 
painful than buying is pleasurable. The delay-advancement asymmetry 
may explain why citizens are extremely frustrated by slowly developing 
5 See, for example, David S. Brookshire & Don L. Coursey, Measuring the Value of a 
Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 554 
(1987); David W. Harless, More Laboratory Evidence on the Disparity between Willingness 
to Pay and Compensation Demanded, 11 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 359 (1989). 
6 See George Loewenstein, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Inter- 
pretation (working paper, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 1988). 
7 This "immediacy effect" (special preference for immediate outcomes) parallels the 
"certainty effect" (special preference for certain outcomes) in prospect theory. 
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technology that always seems to get delayed (for example, testing of 
AIDS drugs). 
2. Difficulty of Learning. Psychologists who study judgment are 
mostly pessimistic about the ability of people to learn from experience. 
For instance, expert clinical psychologists with decades of practice are no 
better at diagnosis than graduate students and little better than novices 
(though they are more confident and quicker).8 Predictions of simple sta- 
tistical models about student academic success, recidivism of criminals, 
mental illness, financial performance, and the like are invariably better 
than predictions of experts.9 
Why do people not learn more from experience? Studies show that 
learning is difficult unless feedback is clear, frequent, and quick. Weath- 
ermen get such feedback; they do learn to make good forecasts.'0 For 
chief executive officers and policymakers, learning is difficult because 
important risks unfold over long periods of time and feedback is unclear. 
It is hard to learn about risk-reducing programs like promotion of safe 
sex, changes in the drinking age, or tighter security at airports. Extremely 
successful programs, such as polio vaccination, cause risks to disappear 
so entirely that the feedback from them may be forgotten. 
Especially maddening are systems with long lags between the initiation 
of a program and substantial effect (like environmental cleanup, birth 
control, or educational programs). In long-lag systems, optimal strategies 
are hard to derive and are often counterintuitive; human performance in 
such systems (studied experimentally)" is terrible. 
The main implication of this pessimistic view of learning is that program 
evaluation must be careful, frequent, and quick for policymakers and 
citizens to learn from results. 
3. Ambiguity about Probability. To a decision theorist, most risks are 
not risks at all. When the probability distribution of outcomes is un- 
known, such situations are usually called "uncertain" (Frank Knight's 
term) or "ambiguous." The classic thought experiment about ambiguity 
was proposed by Daniel Ellsberg.12 Consider a bingo cage K (for 
8 See Howard Garb, Clinical Judgment, Clinical Training, and Professional Experience, 
105 Psych. Bull. 387 (1989). 
9 See Colin F. Camerer, General Conditions for the Success of Bootstrapping Models, 27 
Org. Behav. Human. Perf. 411 (1981); Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust, & Paul E. Meehl, 
Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 Science 1668 (1989). 
1o See Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff, & Lawrence D. Phillips, Calibration of 
Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky eds., supra 
note 2. 
" See John D. Sterman, Testing Behavioral Simulation Models by Direct Experiment,-33 
Mgmt. Sci. 1572 (1987). 
12 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. Econ. 643 (1961). 
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"known") with fifty red and fifty black balls and a cage U (for unknown) 
with one hundred red and black balls of unknown distribution. People 
often prefer to bet on a red draw from the K cage instead of a red draw 
from the U cage; the same is true for bets on black. 
Suppose subjective probabilities are revealed by choices. Since people 
are typically indifferent between betting on red or black from the K cage, 
we conclude that PK (red) = PK (black) = .5. Preferring a red draw from 
K implies Pu (red) < .5;13 preferring a black draw from K implies Pu 
(black) < .5, too. Pu (red) + Pu (black) is then less than one, violating the 
principle of additivity of complementary events.14 Something must give: 
either additivity or the principle of inferring subjective probabilities from 
choices. 
Ellsberg's elegant paradox shows that probabilities must carry two bur- 
dens at once: they must express likelihood and they must also express the 
amount of information, confidence, or "weight of evidence." In each 
cage, red and black seem to have equal likelihood, but we have more 
confidence that the likelihoods are .5 in cage K. One number cannot 
express both properties. 
In some recent formal theory,15 it has been shown that it is reasonable 
to use a variant of "minimax" to make decisions under ambiguity: choose 
the gamble that has the highest minimum expected utility, where the 
minimum is taken over all the possible distributions the probabilities 
might have. 
Minimax thinking (freshly blessed by this theoretical justification) ap- 
pears in studies of actuaries and underwriters, who attach higher selling 
prices when risks are ambiguous.16 And, of course, changes in tort law- 
even possible changes--generate ferocious ambiguity that could (and 
should, according to the recent theory) scare insurance companies out of 
many markets because the risk of rule changes is not diversifiable.17 
4. Value Ambiguity and Contingent Weighting. If probabilities can 
"3 In subjective expected utility, probabilities can (only) be inferred from bets. Since the 
gain from winning a red bet from the U and K urns is the same, preferring the K urn reveals 
that PK (red) > Pu (red). 
14 Additivity means P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive (that is, 
P(A and B) = 0). 
"5 See Truman Bewley, Knightian Decision Theory: Part I (unpublished manuscript, Yale 
University, Cowles Foundation, 1986); David Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Ex- 
pected Utility without Additivity, 57 Econometrica 571 (1989). 
16 Robin M. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther, Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance, 2 J. Risk 
Uncertainty 5 (1989). 
17 See, for example, Patricia Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private 
Insurance Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517, 539 (1984); George L. Priest, The Current Insur- 
ance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987). 
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be ambiguous, can values be ambiguous, too? They can and are. Value 
ambiguity can explain buyer/seller discrepancies just as loss aversion 
does. Suppose people are not sure what hazardous waste risks are worth 
to them, but they have an ambiguous distribution of possible worths. 
When asked to pay to reduce risk, they name a price at the low end of the 
worth distribution. Asked their price for bearing more risk, they name a 
number on the high end of the distribution. 
A dramatic class of "compatibility" effects are consistent with value 
ambiguity, too. Consider two risks, a "P bet" (for example, 95 percent 
chance of three dollars) and a "$ bet" (for example, a 30 percent chance 
of ten dollars). Asked to choose between the two bets, most people who 
pick the P bet instead of the $ bet later attach a higher selling price to the $ 
bet than to the P bet. These preference reversals are astonishing and 
robust.'8 (Money pumping of subjects'9 reduces the dollar magnitude of 
the pricing discrepancy, but not its frequency.)20 
Psychologists now think that such reversals occur because people over- 
emphasize the attribute that is compatible with the response mode they 
are using. When people choose, probability looms large (it is the more 
"prominent" attribute-the theory does not say exactly why-and thus 
gets more weight in choice). When they set a price, the dollar attribute 
looms large.21 These data are especially bothersome because the choices 
are simple gambles with known probabilities and only one attribute of 
value (dollars). Imagine how arbitrary revealed preferences over com- 
plicated policy choices, with many attributes, might be. 
The implication for risk assessment is that choices between risks will be 
different from patterns of preference inferred by "matching" attribute 
values until two risks are equally preferred. 
18 See Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Reversals of Preference between Bids and 
Choices in Gambling Decisions, 89 J. Exp. Psych. 46 (1971); David M. Grether & Charles R. 
Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon, 69 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 623 (1979); Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Preference Reversals: A Broader Per- 
spective, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 596 (1983); Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, & Daniel Kahneman, 
The Causes of Preference Reversals, Am. Econ. Rev. (in press). 
19 In a money pump, or Dutch book, the experimenter would continually sell $ bets to 
subjects at high prices, switch the $ bets for P bets, then buy the P bets back from subjects at 
lower prices. This cycle leaves the subjects where they began-with no bets-except for the 
loss of wealth from buying high and selling low. 
20 See Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, & John O'Brien, Preference Reversal and Arbitrage, in 
3 Research in Experimental Economics (Vernon Smith ed. 1985); Marc Knez & Vernon L. 
Smith, Hypothetical Valuations and Preference Reversals in the Context of Asset Trading, 
in Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View (Alvin Roth ed. 1987). 
21 Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath, & Paul Slovic, Contingent Weighting in Judgment and 
Choice, 95 Psych. Rev. 371 (1988). (For compatibility effects to exist, people must be 
ambiguous about the proper trade-off between dimensions.) 
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Consider the comparison between two programs that both clean a pol- 
luted beach. Full cleanup costs $750,000 and makes the beach suitable for 
both sunbathing and swimming. Partial cleanup costs $250,000 but leaves 
the beach unsuitable for swimming. 
Cost ($) Outcome 
Full 750,000 can swim 
Partial 250,000 cannot swim 
In a choice between the two, 48 percent of people preferred full 
cleanup.22 But policy situations sometimes require a matching of budget 
amounts to make programs equally attractive, rather than a choice be- 
tween programs. A proponent of partial cleanup might ask, "Tell me how 
much a partial cleanup program would have to cost to make it just as good 
as full cleanup?" That is, match the value of C in the table below to make 
full and partial cleanup equally appealing. 
Cost ($) Outcome 
Full 750,000 can swim 
Partial C cannot swim 
According to contingent weighting, people will underweight cost rela- 
tive to the extent of cleanup in making a choice (assuming cleanup is more 
important to people than money). But in the matching task (choosing C), 
the matched dimension of cost will be overweighted. People will state 
large values of C because the gap between $750,000 and C-the marginal 
cost of full cleanup-looms larger when matching. Then C will be greater 
than $250,000. But if full cleanup at $750,000 and partial cleanup at cost C 
are equally good, and C > $250,000, then partial cleanup at a cheaper cost 
of $250,000 is certainly better than full cleanup at $750,000.23 The match- 
ing response mode should therefore favor the more economical partial 
cleanup (at the initial costs of $750,000 and $250,000), and it did in experi- 
ments: 88 percent of matching-mode subjects expressed an implicit pref- 
erence for partial cleanup (by choosing C > $250,000), but only 48 percent 
preferred partial cleanup in a direct choice. 
These data show that the way in which choices are made, directly or by 
22 Id. at 373. 
23 We assume that spending less is preferred to spending more and that choices are 
transitive. (Partial cleanup at cost C is indifferent to full cleanup at $750,000, and partial 
cleanup at $250,000 is preferred to partial cleanup at cost C, which implies that partial 
cleanup at $250,000 is preferred to full cleanup at $750,000.) 
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filling in attributes during debate and negotiation, makes a striking differ- 
ence in what is decided. 
III. SOME SUBTLETIES IN BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY 
Some of Noll and Krier's semantic usage is unorthodox. The orthodox 
definitions are sharper and more fruitful. Noll and Krier define "cogni- 
tive" decision theory as prospect theory and studies of judgment heuris- 
tics. We prefer the term "behavioral" decision theory because judgment 
errors result from motivation (what people want) as well as from cognition 
(how people think). Behavioral decision theory also includes research on 
learning, problem representation, errors in logic, modeling complex judg- 
ments, and more. 
Noll and Krier call the "representativeness" heuristic "a tendency to 
reason by analogy to previous circumstances."24 The original definition is 
deliberately more precise: people judge the likelihood that a sample was 
generated by a statistical process by how well the sample represents (or 
resembles) the process. (Representativeness may also be used to judge 
the likelihood of a value coming from a distribution, an object coming 
from a class, or an effect being due to a cause.)25 
Representativeness causes mistakes by leading to violations of norma- 
tive principles. Two examples follow: (1) Since prior probabilities play no 
role in the mental calculus of representativeness, people will fear hazards 
with low prior probabilities (like economic depression) when they see 
warning signs that are highly representative of the hazards. (2) If people 
expect the future to be representative of the past, they will ignore or 
misattribute the natural effects of regression toward the mean (when the 
past is extreme, the future will be less extreme). For example, if policies 
are enacted when a problem is especially severe, and its severity naturally 
regresses, the policy will appear to have worked even if it did not actually 
help. 
The crucial axiom in expected utility is "independence": if two risks 
yield a common outcome with a common probability (and differ on other 
outcomes), preference between them should be independent of the com- 
mon outcome. A related property is called "dynamic consistency": fu- 
ture choices should be consistent with plans made during previous 
choices. (More formally, choices at early nodes in a decision tree should 
assume choices at later nodes will be optimal.) Noll and Krier call the 
24 NOll & Krier, supra note 3, at text around note 10. 
25 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky eds., supra note 2. (The source Noll and Krier cite in their 
note 11 actually cites an earlier Tversky and Kahneman paper.) 
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latter principle "rational expectations,"26 which usually refers to the 
more general assumption that agents in an economic theory understand 
that theory. 
Their unorthodox labeling obscures the important difference between 
dynamic consistency (also known as "rational expectations") and inde- 
pendence. In expected utility theory, those two principles go hand in 
hand, so calling dynamic consistency the crucial property is odd (actually, 
independence is crucial) but harmless. But in other theories, the two 
principles need not coincide. In prospect theory, people who "isolate" 
future choices are dynamically consistent, but they violate independence. 
Then policy reversals will be uncommon even if people use prospect 
theory to make choices, exactly contrary to Noll and Krier's conclu- 
sion.27 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Evidence that judgments and choices often violate normative principles 
has aroused curiosity about the fundamental question of how individual 
judgments and choices aggregate to group, firm, market, and governmen- 
tal decisions. Noll and Krier take up the governmental part of the ques- 
tion with gusto. Their analysis relies mostly on the value and decision- 
weighting (probability-transformation) functions of prospect theory. 
Producing direct predictions from these functions is hard; simpler anal- 
yses might be equally fruitful. Other topics in judgment research that 
might be useful, too, include choice over time, difficulty of learning, 
ambiguity about probabilities, and contingent weighting of dimensions. 
These ideas should help sharpen our understanding of the demand side of 
risk policy-that is, how people think about risk and its reduction. 
26 Noll & Krier, supra note 3, at sec. I. 
27 Id. at sec. IIA. 
